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Editors' Note: In 2002, The Urban Lawyer printed a series of articles 
from the AALS State and Local Government Section Annual Meeting 
Panel, New Developments in State and Local Tax: E-Commerce, Tax 
Incentives for Business and Litigation-Generated Revenues. ** At the 
time local governments were beginning to feel the financial pinch of 
revenue shortfalls. Now, two years later, the situation is even more 
grave. Since the beginning of 2003, local newspapers have been filled 
with articles evaluating the wisdom of cities large and small that have 
mortgaged their financial well being by offering large incentive pack-
ages to lure corporations to come to their community or stay within 
their community. t 
Audrey McFarlane responds to this panel discussion and provides a 
closer examination of the realities of business tax incentives. 
I. Introduction 
THE PANEL TOPIC was relatively straightforward: consider various cre-
ative efforts by local government to raise revenues through taxation. 
*Audrey G. McFarlane, Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
**Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415 
(2002); Janice C. Griffith, State and Local Revenue Enhancement and Taxation Policies 
in a Digital Age: E-Commerce Taxation, Business Tax Incentives, and Litigation Gen-
erated Revenues, 34 URB. LAW. 429 (2002); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use 
Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Political Issues, 
34 URB. LAW. 487 (2002). 
t See, e.g., Analisa Nazareno, Wising Up About Development; Even Before Toyota, 
City Leaders Had Refined Their Pitches to Potential Employers, SAN ANTONIO Ex-
PRESS NEWS, February 22, 2003 (detailing change in the city's Economic Development 
Department to a focused, organized, and strategic search for companies that fit within 
a specified group of industries known to have favorable growth and certain wage struc-
tures); Bob Mims, Shattered Dreams, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., reprinted in PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, March 7, 2003 (discussing millions of dollars in loans and tax incen-
tives the City of Riverton, Utah, granted to Intel Corp. in hopes that the company would 
employ over 8,000 in their community, when in fact only 400 are currently employed); 
RJ. King, Economy Blunts Impact of Compuware' s Move, THE DETROIT NEWS, March 
2,2003 (scaling back its plans, Compuware Corp. will bring 2,000 employees to down-
town Detroit as opposed to the 4, I 00 employees it initially promised when it received 
more than $70 million in tax breaks). 
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The need to raise revenue is self-evident: maintaining community, gov-
erning, and providing essential services requires resources. The papers 
delivered during this panel were about more than revenue raising, 
however. They were about how this essentially local endeavor is taking 
place within the context of a globalized economy.! Globalization has 
led to unprecedented and rapid mobility through the decentralization 
of trade, production, and communication. The challenge to local 
governments is how best to cope with this unprecedented mobility and 
in particular, how to identify a valid nexus between resources and 
taxation. 
This response first discusses briefly the common themes raised by 
the panelists about the mobility and nexus challenges presented by 
globalization. It then comments more extensively on Peter Enrich's 
article on the troubling proliferation of state and local business tax 
incentives.2 While I agree that a national approach (whether through 
judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause or federal legislative 
intervention) looks like it would be helpfuJ,3 I believe the discussion 
of this issue should be broadened to look more closely at why state and 
local governments offer incentives. Incentives should not simply be 
dismissed as arising merely from state and local government officials 
acting from corrupt or self-serving motives. On the other hand, the 
proliferation of business tax incentives begs a closer examination of 
the direction of public resources exclusively toward a narrow, if not 
skewed, vision of economic development. 
I. Though the term globalization is used often and loosely, it is a useful term for 
characterizing a global process of increasing mobility and interconnectedness of trade, 
methods of production, communication, and people and capital flowing across national 
boundaries regulated only by the limits of technology and publicly unaccountable in-
ternational trade organizations like the World Trade Organization. See generally SAS-
KIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed. 2000). While 
this has not broken down patterns of racial or economic segregation and in fact has 
probably enhanced them in new and troublingly intractable ways, the impact on local 
governments has been no less considerable. 
2. Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415 
(2002). 
3. A commerce clause challenge is ostensibly focused on the distortion of free com-
merce, it remains to be seen, however, how courts will sort through the difference 
between the natural versus the impermissible destructiveness of competition especially 
in the face of likely state claims that incentives have allowed them the discretion to 
experiment and successfully promote economic development. See, e.g., Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991) (assessing the benefits of a federalist structure of 
government is that it produces "a decentralized government ... more sensitive to di-
verse needs of a heterogeneous society ... increases opportunity for citizen involve-
ment in democratic processes ... allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and ... makes government more responsive by putting the States in com-
petition for a mobile citizenry."). 
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II. Globalization and the Mobility Challenge 
Every day trillions of dollars circle the globe in seconds as foreign 
investments and currency speculation. Major corporations operate in-
ternationally facilitated by satellite communications, the Internet, as 
well as by the ability to outsource their production to independent con-
tractors. Domestically, people need not live or shop where they work; 
instead they use automobiles, telephones, and computers to conduct the 
business of daily life. The three panel presentations dramatically illus-
trate the challenge that globalization presents for state and local gov-
ernments that are fixed in place geographically. Each panelist high-
lighted the different dimensions of the mobility dilemma and challenge. 
Charles McLure's exhaustive examination of the appropriate way for 
state and local governments to tax internet transactions4 highlights the 
problems raised by transactions that not only take place outside of a 
local government's boundaries but often arguably do not take place 
anywhere. The geographical nature of many of today's transactions 
raises daunting issues regarding the nexus between transactions and 
geographical place as well as enforcement problems. 
David Gelfand considered the mobility of guns and cities' inability 
to close their borders to the influx of illegal weapons.s Gelfand's ex-
ploration of manufacturer products liability for the deadly conse-
quences of urban gun violence highlights the ineffectiveness of local 
gun prohibitions against the influx of weapons into a city and their use 
by those inclined to violence.6 The all too common media reports about 
murders by gun (often causing the resulting injury and devastation to 
seem ordinary) makes the notion of product liability as compensation 
for cities appealing by offering some action that can be taken. 
The balance of this commentary will focus on Peter Enrich's article 
about the proliferation of business tax incentives. In many respects this 
topic highlights the quintessential local government attempt to meet the 
mobility challenge and transcend the limits of a fixed geographical 
position in a globalizing world. In this and other work,? Enrich argues, 
in effect, that cities and states are losing the mobility challenge. Locked 
in a competitive race to the bottom, they offer often staggering grants 
4. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal, 
Economic, Administrative and Political Issues, 34 URB. LAW. 487 (2002). 
5. David Gelfand, Address at the AALS Annual Meeting, State and Local Govern-
ment Section Panel (Jan. 5, 2001). 
6. Id. 
7. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause 
Constraints on Business Tax Incentives, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996). 
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of public monies to private corporations in a bid to attract new firms 
to relocate or prevent current in-state firms from leaving.8 Enrich com-
pellingly demonstrates the excesses that accompany the bargains made 
by cities and mobile business entities as certain firms use their mobility 
to exploit interstate and intercity competition for business. The transfer 
of substantial amounts of public dollars into the hands of private cor-
porations is troubling. As Enrich notes, often these public dollars are 
transferred for relocations that a corporation might have made anyway.9 
Moreover, what results, at best, is not job creation but job relocation 
from one area in the United States to another. Io Enrich argues that use 
of business tax incentives to direct commerce into a state in this manner 
violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Enrich's pro-
posal, which is provocative from a local government scholar's per-
spective, that federal courts must intervene to protect state and local 
governments enthralled in a seemingly inescapable, self-destructive, 
zero-sum inter-city and inter-state competition. 12 Enrich posits correctly 
that many public officials feel they have no other choice when faced 
with competition from other states and localities that are offering in-
centives. Local politicians are often anxious to appear to provide jobs 
for constituents in order to reinforce their own political positions. While 
I agree with Professor Enrich's considered reasoning on the merits and 
viability of a Commerce Clause challenge,I3 it is helpful to consider 
further the actual context within which state and local governments 
offer business incentives in order to expand our understanding of why 
courts, state or federal, might have difficulty invalidating business in-
centives. 
8. A number of mechanisms or forms of assistance exist: (I) real property tax 
abatement or exemption; (2) low interest loans or loan guarantees; (3) direct grants; 
(4) sales tax and franchise tax exemptions; (5) mortgage recording tax exemptions; (6) 
subsidized energy costs; (7) tax-exempt bond financing; (8) below-market lease rates; 
(9) public improvements that benefit the project; (10) use or threatened use of eminent 
domain to assist assemblage; and (II) special zoning variances that allow larger pro-
jects or use variations. Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 
19 URB. LAW. 193 (1987). 
9. Enrich, supra note 2, at 416. 
10. Enrich, supra note 2, at 416. 
II. Enrich, supra note 2, at 415; U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 8. 
12. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 
URB. LAW. 415 (2002). 
13. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: 
State and Local Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 233,244 (1999) (arguing that the empirical data shows that Supreme Court is 
unlikely to strike down dormant Commerce Clause challenges unless other states join 
the challenge); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent 
to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998). 
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We should consider that economic development is one of the en-
deavors of local government to provide for the common good. While 
the warlike metaphor of competition between states and cities to lure 
or retain businesses is an essential characterization, it is limited in its 
usefulness for understanding the context within which business incen-
tives operate. In particular, the metaphor of competition looks outward 
for an understanding of incentives but fails to look inward at a particular 
local government's motivation to offer such incentives. Another meta-
phor, "good housekeeping" is illustrative: state and local officials are 
responsible for overseeing the orderly development of the metropolitan 
area. Since local governments depend on the presence of residents who 
must be employed, it has become part of local government's respon-
sibility to ensure that such residents and employers are provided a clean 
and hospitable environment in which to reside and operate. Facilitating 
local development through tax or other incentives are part of a collec-
tion of tools that local government's "good housekeeping" and hospi-
tality supplies. 14 In other words, incentives satisfy a psychological need 
as well as a political one: they give the impression to state and local 
officials that they are doing something; they have the power and ability 
to actually take control of or respond to the mobility challenge regard-
less of whether or not this is truly the case. 
III. The Long-Standing Use of Business Incentives 
This is not the first time that the question has arisen of if and how local 
governments should be constrained in their attempt to provide for their 
future development. State and local government promotion and support 
of business, as well as the actual conduct of business enterprises, have 
been fixtures of the history of state and local government. Beginning 
in the 1790s states actively promoted economic development (or, as it 
was termed then, "internal improvements") through investment in in-
14. Indeed, business incentives may have no other appeal or motivation other than 
an emotional one: state and local government officials know that it feels good to get a 
tax break. I speak from related personal experience because I received an incentive 
when I decided to move into the City of Baltimore. Even though I had independently 
made my decision to move, it felt good to receive a modest grant to reduce settlement 
costs from a city-sponsored program. I felt that the welcome wagon had been rolled 
out and felt reassured that I had made a good decision. Similarly, I imagine that business 
executives who are considering where to locate their businesses or where to stay in 
some ways seek and receive incentives as part of an emotional communication that the 
city is hospitable and to reassure the corporate decision-maker that its business is 
welcome and the city will be responsive to its needs. The state or local government 
signals that the company has made the right decision in choosing to remain in or 
relocate to their jurisdiction. 
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frastructure and transportation, legal innovation to promote corpora-
tions and banks as well as engaging in the sale of land. 15 Of course, 
such investment could and did take the form of business incentives 
such as tax exemptions, state chartering of companies or subscriptions 
for direct public ownership of stock in private corporations. 16 Local 
governments became more heavily involved in "internal improvement" 
during the 1840s, making "most of the important infrastructure invest-
ments in education, highways, water systems, sewer systems and public 
utilities."17 
The mid-nineteenth century rivalry between cities competing first for 
canals and then for railroads resulted in the amassing of incredible 
amounts of debt to lure the railroads to a particular locality through 
public investment in construction, grant of state powers of eminent 
domain, and outright grants of public funds. IS The need to go to these 
lengths seemed real: cities that failed to get the railroads no longer 
exist. 19 
The result was a series of debt crises, often with international sig-
nificance. Local governments either defaulted or came perilously close 
to defaulting on repayment of bonds that often had European investors 
who failed to understand that, under the federal system of government, 
the bonds did not have the full faith and credit of the United States.20 
The nineteenth century legal response was twofold. First, state courts 
began to interpret the new and existing doctrines and provisions to 
prohibit state government from interacting with private business by 
developing and applying the public purpose doctrine to restrict state 
and local use of the taxing power 21 and indirectly the spending power, 
and the eminent domain power. Second, legislatures amended their state 
15. John Joseph Wallis, American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to 
1990, 141. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 62 (Winter 2000). 
16. See Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation 
on Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427,428 (1995) 
(observing that as early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton obtained a tax exemption from 
the state of New Jersey). 
17. Wallis, supra note 15, at 62. 
18. Wallis, supra note 15, at 66-68; JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN 
LAW 20-21 (200 I). 
19. ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CiTIES, U.S. FEDER-
ALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 48-50 (Bert A. Rockan ed., University of Pitts-
burgh Press 1996) (noting the demise of Sandusky, Ohio; Leavenworth, Missouri; and 
Galena and Park City, Kansas). 
20. Jd. at 37, 39-40. 
21. Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public Purpose 
Doctrine, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 143, 148 (1993). See Sharpless v. Mayor of 
Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) (one of the earliest cases utilizing the public purpose 
doctrine). 
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constitutions to institute constitutional debt limits, prohibit gifts of pub-
lic funds, and specify that taxation must be for public purposes. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government played a sub-
stantial role in initiating and supporting economic development and, as 
compared to the nineteenth century, state and local government inter-
action with business receded, although never disappeared.22 When fed-
eral support began to decline in the 1970s, states and local governments 
again took up the mantle of interacting closely with private business to 
ensure a business presence within their jurisdictions.23 One might think 
that since the nineteenth century doctrines and constitutional provisions 
are still in place, states already have institutionalized a state-based curb 
on excessive business tax incentives. In fact the opposite is true; state 
doctrines are often insufficient to curb excessive business tax and other 
economic development incentives to private entities. 
IV. Inadequacy of State Doctrine Against Excessive Use of Business 
Incentives in Face of the Mystical Nature of Economic Development 
Ostensibly, state constitutions provide local citizens and courts consid-
erable legal tools at their disposal to police and challenge incentives. 
As it turns out, however, these long-standing doctrines and constitu-
tionallimitations that are directly designed and intended to address the 
current problem are presently not enforced. In fact their evasion is an 
accepted, albeit bizarre, aspect of state and local government law.24 
Moreover, the current understanding of economic development (even 
if it means substantial transfers of public money to subsidize private 
corporate activity) is that such activity fulfills a public purpose. If a 
claimant challenges a business incentive as an expenditure of revenue 
received through taxation as not being for a valid public purpose, a 
court is likely to uphold the validity of the incentive under most cir-
22. See Gregory Squires, Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City. in MARK 
GOfrDIENER & CHRIS PICKVANCE, URBAN LIFE IN TRANSITION 196-98 (1991) (at-
tributing increased local government participation in public/private partnership in pur-
suit of economic development to the decline in federal revenues). 
23. See Bruce J. Casino, Federal Grants·in·Aid: Evolution. Crisis. and Future. 20 
URB. LAW. 25 (1988) (discussing impact of reduction in federal grants-in-aid on state 
and local governments); See generally PETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL STATE: STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 3-6 (1988). 
24. See SBRAGlA supra note 19, at 118-21, 135-36 (discussing the use of the rev-
enue bond and public authorities to circumvent state constitutional debt limits); DENNIS 
ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: CONTROLLING PUBLIC SUB-
SIDY OF PRIVATE ACTIVITY (1991). See. e.g .. Mun. Bldg. Auth. of Iron County Utah 
v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985) (approving construction of jail facilities financed 
by revenue bonds following voter disapproval of issuance of general obligation bonds). 
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cumstances.25 If an incentive is challenged as a gift of public funds to 
a private entity, most courts will uphold the incentive as having a benefit 
to the general public.26 If an exercise of eminent domain on behalf of 
a private developer or corporation is chaIlenged for taking of property 
not for a public purpose, the exercise will likely be upheld as having a 
public purpose. 27 Public purpose has been and wiII continue to be read 
broadly, and this is probably a correct interpretation. Any activity with 
private benefit may be deemed by a court or a legislature to have public 
benefit. A distinct substantive line delineating public from private has 
proved very difficult to draw in the abstract. 
The real reason, however, is that public purpose requires a substan-
tive evaluation based on a judge's personal opinion about the validity 
of the underlying activity. Courts are loathe to second-guess many leg-
islative decisions but in particular decisions that have "economic de-
velopment" as their underlying justification. Even in the extreme cases, 
like Toledo's proposed deal with Daimler-Chrysler,28 how can the court 
say that in the future, the deal, as lopsided as it is, will not work out 
or at least be publicly perceived to have had some benefit, albeit an 
expensive one? Even though incentives have not been proven directly 
to cause the promised benefits, who wishes to be the first to claim that 
the next set of incentives would not have the promised effect? State 
judges, particularly elected ones, could be said to have self-interested 
motives, which means they would never want to challenge economic 
development incentives. But even judges acting from purely selfless 
motives would be hard pressed to overturn incentives as not fulfilling 
a valid public purpose. 
The reason for judicial deference is that a narrative or discourse of 
economic development plays a substantial role in the ineffectiveness of 
the public purpose clauses or doctrine as a method for policing business 
incentives. Aided by a discourse or narrative of economic development 
25. See, e.g., Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (upholding 
constitutionality of economic development incentive grants as satisfying the need for 
taxation to be for a public purpose). 
26. See, e.g., CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 947 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Wash. 1997) (public 
financing of privately-owned retail store parking garage upheld as having adequate 
consideration to satisfy prohibition on gift of public funds). 
27. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954) (approving the use of em-
inent domain to transfer private property to private developers; fighting urban blight is 
a valid public purpose); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (approving use of eminent domain to transfer residential 
property to auto company; promoting economic development and combating unem-
ployment is a valid public purpose). 
28. See Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 
415 (2002). 
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that relies on tenns like "business-friendly," "public-private partner-
ship," and "empowennent,"29 public officials use these tenns, along 
with the positive and unchallengeable associations these words evoke, 
to channel the definition and understanding of the public need and 
interest into the need to do whatever it takes, incentives and all, toward 
the imperative to promote growth. 3D Use of the tenn "discourse" is at 
once a way of describing a set of practices as well as identifying the 
effect that these practices have. The practices involve a dialogue, a set 
of activities and thought surrounding "development" that do not allow 
other thoughts (such as social development separate and apart from an 
economic justification) or seemingly contradictory actions (such as 
public participation in economic development decision-making) to take 
place within the public realm. The effect is to marginalize to the side-
lines of public discussion or debate other equally important concerns 
or needs as competing realities that challenge the benefits of economic 
development. 
For example, if we were to look beyond the discourse of economic 
development we might observe that local economic development is 
specifically structured to meet the high-end employment, service, en-
tertainment, and shopping needs of the "global elite." The types of jobs 
attracted often are filled by existing employees who transfer with the 
company or require skills and education that do not benefit unemployed 
or underemployed low-income residents of a particular areaY To the 
extent economic development involves redevelopment, the emphasis is 
often on luxury hotels, sports complexes, festival market places, and 
convention centers. 
Also, economic development tends to take part in an elite-dominated 
29. See Tim Richardson & Ole B. Jensen, Discourses of Mobility and Polycentric 
Development: A Contested View of European Spatial Planning. 8 EUROPEAN PLANNING 
STUD. 503. 504 (2000); Rob Atkinson, Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment 
in Contemporary British Urban Regeneration. 36 URB. STUD. 59, 60 (1999); David 
Wilson, Metaphors. Growth Coalition Discourses and Black Poverty Neighborhoods 
in a U.S. City. 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors used in "growth" 
discourse in urban development). 
30. Also, once you make the claim that an activity is related to "development" of 
any sort, the very word itself stands for favorable change. Webster's dictionary defines 
it as moving from "inferior to the superior [and] from worse to better." Add in the term 
economic and the positive association is irrefutable. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 618 (1961). 
31. See TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO BENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? 192 (1991) (arguing that local economic development in-
centives may be justified when pursued by high unemployment areas but are to be 
deplored when pursued by low unemployment areas); TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, JOBS FOR 
THE POOR: CAN LABOR DEMAND POLICIES HELP? 249-86 (2001) (suggesting that 
national incentives could encourage on-the-job skills enhancement and training). 
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and privatized decision-making process in which avenues for citizen 
input are rare. Notwithstanding these undeniable facts, economic de-
velopment continues to operate unabated to the benefit of the few and 
the comparatively well-off. Until courts perceive a crisis with similar 
dimensions to the nineteenth century debt crisis context, in which they 
feel a need to intervene to prevent rampant corruption or bad faith 
dealing, business incentives will continue to satisfy the public purpose 
requirement.32 The public purpose and constitutional-aid provisions and 
doctrines were adopted at the time when the perception was of "public 
plunder by private entities."33 Today, the perception is that public-
private partnerships are beneficial, if not inevitable. The legacy of 
public-private partnerships is that the private renders the public legiti-
mate. In an odd way it seems that private enterprise and business le-
gitimizes public government. 
V. The Global Context: Decentralization Leads to 
Exploitation in a Mobile Economy 
The real issue we have to face in the overuse of business incentives is 
to acknowledge that we have decentralized economic decision-making 
without recognizing the exploitative potential of hyper-mobile capital 
and fixed cities. In this respect, perhaps local governments should be 
given a bit more credit for the basis of their economic development 
decision-making. If businesses are mobile then what choice do they 
have? A strong argument could be made that state and local govern-
ments should only serve as suppliers and providers of infrastructure, 
i.e., roads, utilities, and an educated workforce. But as long as one or 
a few states or cities make the money available, mobile corporations 
will be able to exploit the resulting vulnerability. 
The problem is also lack of public accountability. Economic devel-
opment is carried out through a set of privatized structures and pro-
cesses designed primarily, if not exclusively, to meet the needs of busi-
ness elites and encourage capital investment in particular geographic 
areas to promote growth and increase in land prices and rents.34 That 
process is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and shielded from 
32. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments Inc., No. 1999-1318,99-
1230, 2000 WL 782971 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (invalidating exercise of eminent 
domain for economic development purposes for failing to meet public purpose stan-
dard). 
33. Rubin, supra note 21, at 166. 
34. See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62, 73 (1987). 
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public scrutiny.35 This is accomplished through elites wielding informal 
channels of power as well as quasi-private government entities such as 
public authorities that operate free from public scrutiny.36 
Contractual accountability agreements are somewhat appealing but 
Enrich notes quite correctly that as an overall solution to tax incentive 
abuse they probably will not work.3? States can and should mandate 
their use, and mandate that incentives cannot be granted unless certain 
guarantees are made or benchmarks are reached. The problem is that 
accountability threatens to negate the attractiveness of the incentives 
because cities still face the competition problem. Any corporation that 
is held to a strict accountability standard could use this as a basis for a 
threat to leave. In particular, contractual accounting agreements cannot 
work when the city is against the ropes financially. But in the mean 
time, they could perhaps have a limited value as a political tool. For 
example, claiming that a corporation violated an agreement would at 
least be bad publicity for a company. The increasing use of account-
ability agreements also suggests that states are attempting to eliminate 
some of the lopsidedness in the incentive arrangements. The fact that 
states or cities are even willing to place an accountability document 
before a company suggests some giveaways or public subsidies are 
beginning to "smell." Finally, these agreements are potentially quite 
useful in those few geographic areas that offer a unique or special 
characteristic that the corporation will not pass up merely because the 
state stands up for itself. 
VI. Conclusion-Redefine the Definition of Development 
Business tax incentives, as well as other incentives, are an outgrowth 
of decentralized state and local competition. But they should also be 
seen as a way to take an active role in local "good housekeeping." If 
mobile companies are exploiting this decentralized form of managing 
local economic development, we may want to consider how to dis-
courage this exploitation by making it less attractive without elimi-
nating local flexibility initiative. One way might be to address the 
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nation-building, all have strongly anti-participatory traits."). 
36. See ROGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE 
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37. Enrich, supra note 2, at 425. 
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public accountability issue by encouraging the expansion of citizen 
participation in economic development decision-making. Not only 
would this involve public oversight but would truly make the grant 
of public money come with public strings attached. In some ways, 
this suggestion is a cynical one because I do not believe the specter 
of hearings, meetings, and the often cumbersome features of direct 
democracy would be considered desirable. But it makes the point that 
the states themselves are not the sole cause of the problem and perhaps 
reducing the attractiveness of business tax incentives is a worthwhile 
approach to consider. 
If the past is any predictor of the future, the geographical limits to 
mobility will continue to fade. The need to continue to think about 
local government in the context of globalization will increase. Norms 
and standards for appropriate state and local responses to globalization 
have and will continue to evolve. An economic development watchdog 
group has prepared guidelines for how economic development should 
be done.38 Instead of paying cash to corporations or foregoing tax rev-
enues, the better approach is to focus on educating and training a state's 
citizens as well as making the environment a safe and attractive place 
to live with amenities that would be attractive to the type of personnel 
employed by business corporations. Therefore, more important than 
eliminating business tax incentives is to ensure that development is 
conceived and undertaken with the interests of all current residents in 
mind resulting in development and amenities that suit the needs of a 
cross section of residents, not just the very top. This is not currently 
the case. 
38. William Schwenke, Improving Your Business Climate: A Guide to Smarter Pub-
lic Investments in Economic Development, available at http://www.cfed.org/main/ 
econDevlbi/main/newdirectionlImprovClimate.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003) (advo-
cating an alternate definition of a good business climate based on education, physical 
infrastructure, regulation, taxation, business modernization and entrepreneurship). 
